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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge: 
 
The central issue on appeal is the constitutionality of the 
federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1512. A jury 
convicted Willie Tyler of violating the witness tampering 
statute by murdering a potential federal witness. Tyler 
claims error in the admission of a statement he submitted 
in connection with a previous sentencing. He also 
challenges several rulings of the trial court. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Responding to continuing drug trafficking, state and local 
law enforcement officers from Cumberland, Perry, and York 
Counties formed the Tri-County Drug Force in central 
Pennsylvania. In 1991, Doreen Proctor, a resident of 
Cumberland County and an informant for the Tri-County 
Drug Force, began buying narcotics undercover. On 
February 1, 1991, she purchased several grams of cocaine 
from David Tyler, the brother of Willie Tyler. In July 1991, 
David Tyler was arrested for drug trafficking. Doreen 
Proctor testified against David Tyler at his state preliminary 
hearing. She was scheduled to testify as a prosecution 
witness in David Tyler's trial on April 21, 1992. On that 
date, Proctor's severely beaten, lifeless body was found 
alongside a country road in neighboring Adams County, 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Evidence at trial demonstrated that on April 20, 1992, 
the day of Proctor's murder, David Tyler told his brother 
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Willie, "The bitch is going to die tonight," referring to 
Doreen Proctor. Later the same evening, an eyewitness saw 
Willie Tyler showing David how to cock a sawed-off 
shotgun. Another eyewitness said the Tyler brothers tried to 
abduct Doreen Proctor earlier that day but failed because 
too many cars were in the vicinity. On the night of April 20, 
Roberta Ronique Bell, David Tyler's girlfriend, asked Laura 
Mae Barrett to babysit her children while she and David 
Tyler left for the evening. The next morning, while Barrett 
was doing laundry at Bell's house, Bell brought in an 
armful of bloody clothing, telling Barrett that she was to 
say Bell had been home all evening. 
 
On April 21, 1992, Willie Tyler appeared at the home of 
Mary Jane Hodge, where he announced, "It's over. She's 
gone." David Tyler then arrived, stating, "[S]he's dead, and 
I'll be at court, I'll be in court but that bitch won't." Shortly 
after the murder, Barrett returned to Bell's apartment, 
where she observed a fervent argument between Bell, Willie 
Tyler, and David Tyler. During the argument, Bell told 
Willie Tyler, "I shot Doreen, but you killed her." Willie Tyler 
became angry, telling Bell to be quiet because someone 
could be listening. 
 
II. 
 
On July 9, 1992, David Tyler, Willie Tyler, and Ronique 
Bell were arrested by state authorities for the murder of 
Doreen Proctor. On May 18, 1993, after a jury trial, Willie 
Tyler was acquitted of the murder but convicted of 
intimidating a witness.1 The state court ordered a 
postconviction presentence investigation. Following an 
invitation from the Adams County Probation Office, Tyler 
voluntarily submitted a six-page handwritten letter to the 
court. Tyler's first four pages described his childhood, 
education, and work experiences. In the final two pages, 
Tyler acknowledged he had driven his brother to the 
murder scene but denied any intent on his part to kill 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. David Tyler was convicted of murder. Bell was acquitted of all charges, 
but was later convicted for murder in a federal trial. We affirmed Bell's 
federal conviction. United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Proctor. On July 6, 1993, Tyler was sentenced to two to 
four years in state prison. 
 
Federal authorities launched their own investigation into 
the death of Doreen Proctor. After his release from state 
prison, Tyler was indicted by a federal grand jury on April 
16, 1996. In his federal trial, the government introduced 
two inculpatory statements by Tyler, one from July 9, 1992 
and one from July 20, 1992.2 Tyler was convicted of 
conspiracy to tamper with a witness (18 U.S.C. S 371), 
tampering with a witness by murder (18 U.S.C. 
S 1512(a)(1)(A)), tampering with a witness by intimidation 
and threats (18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(1)-(3)), and a related 
firearms offense (18 U.S.C. S 924), and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
 
On appeal, we suppressed Tyler's July 9, 1992 
statement, finding the police failed to "scrupulously honor" 
Tyler's right to remain silent. Tyler, 164 F.3d at 155. We 
remanded to determine whether Tyler waived his Miranda 
rights before making the July 20 statement. Id.  at 159. The 
District Court granted Tyler a new trial, finding his post- 
arrest statements were obtained in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.3 United States v. Tyler, No. 
96-106 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2000). 
 
Before Tyler's second federal trial, an Adams County 
probation officer released Tyler's letter written to the state 
trial judge to the Pennsylvania State Police, who forwarded 
it to the United States Attorney. After the government gave 
notice it would introduce the letter during its case-in-chief, 
Tyler moved to suppress it on Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment grounds. Denying Tyler's motion, the District 
Court allowed the prosecution to introduce the letter. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On July 9, 1992, the night of his arrest, Tyler made an inculpatory 
statement while in police custody and after being warned of his Miranda 
rights. On July 20, 1992, Tyler made another inculpatory statement to 
police. 
 
3. The District Court found "glaring inconsistencies" between a report 
written by one police trooper present and testimony elicited from another 
detective at a later suppression hearing. United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 
150, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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Tyler was acquitted of conspiracy but found guilty of 
tampering with a witness by murder (18 U.S.C. 
S 1512(a)(1)(A)), tampering with a witness by intimidation 
and threats (18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(1)-(3)), and using a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)). On January 5, 2001, Tyler was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.4 This appeal followed. 
 
III. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
IV. 
 
Initially, we consider the constitutionality of the Witness 
Tampering Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1512. Tyler contends the 
statute is unconstitutional because it is impermissibly 
vague, exceeds Congress's constitutional authority under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and violates due process 
by eliminating the prosecutor's burden of proving scienter. 
Exercising plenary review, United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 
569, 576 (3d Cir. 1995), we find these arguments 
unconvincing. 
 
A. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1512, entitled "Tampering with a witness, 
victim, or informant," provides: 
 
       (a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, 
       with intent to-- 
 
        (A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any 
       person in an official proceeding; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Tyler received life imprisonment on the tampering-by-murder charge 
and ten years' imprisonment on the tampering-by-intimidation charge, to 
be served concurrently. Tyler was also sentenced to five years on the 
firearm charge, served consecutively with the tampering-by-murder 
charge, fined $5,000.00, and ordered to pay special assessments 
amounting to $150.00. 
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        (B) prevent the production of a record, document, or 
       other object, in an official proceeding; or 
 
        (C) prevent the communication by any person to a 
       law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
       information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
       conditions of probation, parole, or release pending 
       judicial proceedings; 
 
       shall be punished as provided in paragraph (2). 
 
       . . . 
 
       (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical 
       force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another 
       person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading 
       conduct toward another person, with intent to-- 
 
        (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any 
       person in an official proceeding; 
 
        (2) cause or induce any person to-- 
 
         (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, 
       document, or other object, from an official proceeding; 
 
         (B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object 
       with intent to impair the object's integrity or 
       availability for use in an official proceeding; 
 
         (C) evade legal process summoning that person to 
       appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, 
       or other object, in an official proceeding; or 
 
         (D) be absent from an official proceeding to which 
       such person has been summoned by legal process; or 
 
        (3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a 
       law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
       information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
       conditions of probation, parole, or release pending 
       judicial proceedings; 
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both. 
 
       . . . 
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       (e) For the purposes of this section-- 
 
        (1) an official proceeding need not be pending or 
       about to be instituted at the time of the offense . . . . 
 
       . . . 
 
       (f) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, 
       no state of mind need be proved with respect to the 
       circumstance-- 
 
        (1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, 
       magistrate, grand jury, or government agency is before 
       a judge or court of the United States, a United States 
       magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, 
       or a Federal Government agency; or 
 
        (2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or 
       that the law enforcement officer is an officer or 
       employee of the Federal Government or a person 
       authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal 
       Government or serving the Federal Government as an 
       advisor or consultant. 
 
Sections (a) and (b) of S 1512 each contain state-of-mind 
requirements on the defendant's intent to obstruct justice. 
But under the statute, the prosecution need not prove a 
defendant's state of mind about the federal nature of the 
proceeding (S 1512(f)(1)) or that the law enforcement officer 
is acting on behalf of the federal government (S 1512(f)(2)). 
Tyler contends the failure to include mens rea requirements 
for those elements provides no guidance for conviction, 
violating his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 
and rendering the statute void for vagueness. In his briefs 
and at oral argument, Tyler supports this argument with 
little more than a citation to Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352 (1983).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Kolender, the Supreme Court held the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
"requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Id. at 357 (quotations and citations 
omitted). The Court also indicated the second element was more 
"important," because without "minimal guidelines, a criminal statute 
may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Id. at 358 (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
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Tyler's argument is essentially a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. S 1512. We will address it as 
such.6 First, we note S 1512 is not bereft of scienter 
requirements. Tyler was convicted under S 1512(a) 
(tampering with a witness by murder) and S 1512(b) 
(tampering with a witness by intimidation and threats), 
both of which expressly contain "with intent to" provisions. 
At issue is whether the scienter requirements apply to 
S 1512(f), which addresses the defendant's knowledge that 
the proceeding is a federal one (S 1512(f)(1)) and the 
defendant's knowledge that the judge or law enforcement 
officer is acting "for or on behalf of " the federal government 
S 1512(f)(2)). 
 
Due process requires that a penal statute give persons of 
"common intelligence" fair notice about "what the State 
commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey , 306 U.S. 
451, 453 (1939); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 
1269 (3d Cir. 1996). The plain language of S 1512 forbids a 
person from preventing a potential witness from attending 
or testifying at an "official proceeding" by killing or 
intimidating the potential federal witness. Providing fair 
notice regarding the conduct it prohibits, the statute 
complies with the requirements of constitutional due 
process. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated Tyler knew Doreen Proctor would be 
testifying against his brother in a federal prosecution. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because Tyler's conduct is so clearly prohibited by S 1512, we 
question whether he has standing to challenge the statute's vagueness 
in all its applications. Cf. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) ("A plaintiff who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of 
the law as applied to the conduct of others."); United States v. Loy, 237 
F.3d 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A typical vagueness challenge . . . can 
only be raised by a defendant whose own conduct arguably did not fall 
within the terms of the statute . . . .") (citing United States v. Nat'l 
Dairy 
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963)). But as we reject Tyler's facial 
challenge to S 1512, so would we reject a challenge to the statute "as 
applied" to Tyler. Of course, that Congress could have more precisely 
drafted a criminal statute does not render the statute unconstitutional. 
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975). 
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Unlawful conduct that obstructed her giving testimony was 
directly proscribed by S 1512. The jury was charged that to 
convict Tyler, they would have to find (1) he killed or 
attempted to kill Doreen Proctor; (2) he was motivated by a 
desire to prevent her from communicating with a law 
enforcement officer about a federal offense; and (3) the 
officers with whom Tyler believed Proctor might 
communicate were federal officers. These instructions 
complied with the elements of the statute. The defendant 
need not know the law enforcement officers in the 
proceeding are federally connected. Bell, 113 F.3d at 1348 
("While the statute thus limits its reach to tampering that 
affects a federal proceeding or investigation, it expressly 
does not require that the defendant know or intend 
anything with respect to this federal character."); United 
States v. Porter, 977 F. Supp. 679, 681 (M.D. Pa. 1997). 
The government proved Tyler's conduct constituted a 
federal crime and that Tyler communicated with federal 
officers. Therefore, it met the requirements for conviction 
under S 1512. Tyler's vagueness challenge lacks merit. 
 
B. 
 
Tyler contends 18 U.S.C. S 1512 exceeds Congress's 
scope of authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the United States  
Constitution.7 Specifically, Tyler claims the statute permits 
convictions when no federal interest is implicated, i.e., 
when no federal proceeding is contemplated and when a 
victim did not intend to cooperate with a federal officer. We 
disagree. 
 
Section 1512 is consistent with Congress's "necessary 
and proper" power to regulate the dispensation of justice in 
federal courts. Congress retains authority to "create, define, 
and punish, crimes and offenses, whenever they shall deem 
it necessary and proper by law to do so, for effectuating the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress "[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 18. 
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objects of the Government." United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 
(1 Dall.) 384 (1798).8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit employed this rationale to find a similar 
obstruction-of-justice statute constitutional. Catrino v. 
United States, 176 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1949) ("The . . . 
statute is an outgrowth of Congressional recognition of the 
variety of corrupt methods by which the proper 
administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted 
. . . .").9 Many provisions in the first federal crimes act, 
including ones relating to perjury and bribery,"were plainly 
necessary and proper to the operation of the federal 
courts." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
               
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 96-97 (1997). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The parties did not address whether the Clause itself, or some other 
constitutional provision undergirding the Clause, is the constitutional 
justification for 18 U.S.C. S 1512. But on either basis the statute is 
constitutional. The Necessary and Proper Clause has served as the 
textual source for criminal laws dating to the time of M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In that case, Chief Justice 
Marshall declared constitutional "the punishment of the crimes of 
stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court of the United 
States, 
or of perjury in such court," laws the Court found "certainly conducive 
to the due administration of justice." Id.  at 417. Alternatively, the 
Witness Tampering Act could be seen as a manifestation of Congress's 
constitutional authority to carry out its enumerated powers, including 
the creation of "[t]ribunals inferior to the[S]upreme Court." U.S. CONST. 
art. I, S 8, cl. 9. Congress began legislating in this area with the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, and its 
authority has not been called into doubt. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 472 (1965) (Congress has "power to make rules governing the 
practice and pleading" in federal courts); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice 
and procedure of federal courts."); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 
Wheat.) 264 (1824) ("Congress is not a local legislature . . . . The 
American people thought it a necessary power . . . . Being so conferred, 
it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its 
complete and effectual execution."). 
 
9. Because the Constitution enumerates so few criminal proscriptions, 
"almost the entirety of the federal criminal justice system is built upon 
a Necessary and Proper Clause foundation." Evan H. Caminker, 
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1127, 1140 (2001). 
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Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), on which 
Tyler relies, does not support the argument thatS 1512 is 
unconstitutional. In Printz, the Supreme Court declared 
that portions of the Brady Handgun Law requiring state 
officers to conduct federally mandated background checks 
violated principles of state sovereignty. Id.  at 923-24. In 
contrast, S 1512 implicates no principles of state 
sovereignty, focusing instead on private conduct 
substantially affecting federal law enforcement. The statute, 
like other federal criminal statutes found constitutional, 
"involve[s] an assertion of authority, duly guarded, auxiliary 
to incontestable national power." Greenwood v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).10  
 
C. 
 
Citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. , 513 U.S. 64 
(1994), Tyler contends S 1512 violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by relieving the 
government's burden of proving scienter. Sections 
1512(e)(1), 1512(f)(1), and 1512(f)(2), according to Tyler, 
unconstitutionally permitted conviction even if the 
government failed to prove he interfered with a federal 
proceeding, intended to affect a federal proceeding, or 
intended to prevent communication to a federally 
authorized law enforcement officer. We disagree. 
 
As stated, we have upheld S 1512's scienter 
requirements. Bell, 113 F.3d at 1351 ("the government need 
not prove any state of mind on the part of the defendant 
with respect to the federal character of the proceeding or 
law-enforcement-officer communication that it alleges [the 
defendant] intended to interfere with or prevent"). In X- 
Citement Video, the Supreme Court considered a situation 
in which a statute criminalizes "otherwise innocent 
conduct." 513 U.S. at 72-73. In that context, the Court 
found scienter requirements should be applied broadly. Id.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We likewise dismiss Tyler's "alternative" contention that the statute 
is constitutional as applied only to conduct with a"substantial" effect on 
a federal officer or proceeding. Tyler's conduct meets even this putative 
test. 
11. "Criminal intent serves to separate those who understand the 
wrongful nature of their act from those who do not, but does not require 
knowledge of the precise consequences that may flow from that act once 
aware that the act is wrongful." Id. at 73 n.3. 
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Tyler cannot reasonably allege his participation in the 
intimidation and murder of Doreen Proctor was "otherwise 
innocent." There is no constitutional rationale for applying 
scienter requirements to S 1512(e), S 1512(f)(1), and 
S 1512(f)(2). Congress plainly intended to omit a state-of- 
mind requirement with regard to the federal connection. We 
see no constitutional infirmity here. 
 
V. 
 
Tyler contends the District Court violated his Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by admitting into 
evidence a letter written to his state court judge in 
anticipation of sentencing. Before resting its case, the 
government read parts of it into the record. Thereafter, 
Tyler's attorney read different portions of his letter into the 
record -- those describing Tyler's personal background. 
Both counsel referred to the letter in closing arguments. 
 
We exercise plenary review over alleged constitutional 
errors. United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
A. 
 
Tyler contends the government obtained his letter in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Tyler claims he had a 
"legitimate expectation of privacy," violated by the 
government's "seizing" the presentence letter without a 
warrant or court order. But Tyler had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a letter he voluntarily drafted for 
his state court judge. 
 
After a request from the federal prosecutor, Tyler's state 
sentencing judge turned over the letter on March 22, 2000. 
The court order states the letter is to be delivered"for 
purposes of a handwriting analysis." No further explanation 
was given. But the Assistant United States Attorney 
testified he "requested and received permission" from the 
judge "to take possession of the original letter for 
fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, and use at the retrial 
of Willie Tyler." A letter bearing Tyler's signature would 
require authentication before use at trial. 
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Tyler could not reasonably expect a cloak of 
confidentiality. He knew the letter would be considered by 
the state court judge in sentencing, an open proceeding. 
Nothing prevented the sentencing judge from referring to 
the letter's contents from the bench. Furthermore, Tyler 
desired its consideration. He had no reasonable expectation 
that the letter would not become public. Therefore, we find 
no search or seizure by the government in requesting and 
receiving the letter.12 Regardless, Tyler consented to any 
"search" or "seizure." We reject Tyler's Fourth Amendment 
claim. 
 
B. 
 
Tyler contends he wrote the letter without knowing it 
could be used against him in future proceedings, violating 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Citing 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981), Tyler 
contends at least he should have been advised of his 
Miranda rights before writing his letter. 
 
The District Court found that Tyler knew of his Fifth 
Amendment rights before voluntarily writing his state 
sentencing judge. The Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination must be claimed when self-incrimination is 
threatened. Ordinarily, it cannot be reserved for future 
constitutional battles. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 
427-28 (1984) (observing an individual may lose the benefit 
of the privilege even absent a knowing waiver). As the 
Supreme Court noted in Murphy, "a witness confronted 
with questions that the government should reasonably 
expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must 
assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to 
incriminate himself." Id. at 429. Tyler voluntarily chose to 
provide information he believed would benefit him at 
sentencing. Therefore, assuming a Fifth Amendment 
privilege existed, Tyler waived and forfeited its benefits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Nor did the prosecution's reading the letter constitute a "search" or 
"seizure." Accord United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th 
Cir. 1984) ("The courts have never indicated that the government 
conducts a `search' by reading documents in its possession."). 
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Of course, the general rule prohibiting Tyler from 
reserving his Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination would not apply to statements obtained 
through "inherently coercive custodial interrogations," if 
there was "some identifiable factor [denying] the individual 
a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer." Id. 
at 429. Although Tyler composed his letter in custody, 
there was no "inherently coercive custodial interrogation." 
The District Court found: 
 
       First . . . Tyler knew about his Fifth Amendment rights 
       before the interview. Second, he does not assert that he 
       was compelled to participate. Indeed, he was advised 
       that the letter was voluntary and could focus on 
       anything he wanted to say, not necessarily the crime. 
       Third, the probation officer is not a police officer. He 
       does not interrogate; he gathers information for the 
       court's sentencing decision. Additionally, Tyler does not 
       aver that he would have been penalized if he did not 
       write the letter. 
 
Tyler, No. 96-106, at 16-17. Nor was the letter a response 
to interrogation. Put simply, there was no interrogation 
under the Fifth Amendment. We have never held a 
probation officer must administer Miranda warnings before 
conducting presentence interviews. See United States v. 
Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 660 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing 
this position is consistent with those in other circuits). 
 
Tyler also contends the probation office's disclosure of his 
letter to federal prosecutors violated the Fifth Amendment. 
Claiming the nature of his presentence "interview" had 
changed, exposing him to future federal prosecution, Tyler 
maintains he should have been warned his letter could be 
used against him. But there is no evidence the probation 
officer believed the letter might some day be used in a 
future federal proceeding. The probation officer had no 
obligation to provide Miranda warnings to Tyler solely 
because of the possibility of federal prosecution. See 
Frierson, 945 F.2d at 662 (contrasting cases in which 
defendants voluntarily respond to questions, "deny[ing] a 
portion of criminal conduct that the court found to have 
taken place," with those in which defendants"consistently 
rel[y] on [their] privilege[s] when questioned about related 
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conduct beyond the offense of conviction").13 Moreover, as 
previously stated, the Fifth Amendment does not apply to 
the facts here, where Tyler voluntarily submitted a letter as 
part of a presentence interview by a probation officer. We 
reject both of Tyler's contentions based on alleged Fifth 
Amendment violations. 
 
C. 
 
Tyler suggests the probation officer violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by failing to notify his state 
court attorney when it invited him to write his sentencing 
judge. As noted, Tyler voluntarily wrote his state court 
judge, hoping to reduce his impending sentence. 14 Tyler's 
decision to contact his judge was entirely elective, and for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the probation office did 
not need to inform Tyler's state court counsel. 
 
Though not dispositive, we also observe no court has 
found the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to 
routine presentence interviews. E.g., Castro v. Ward, 138 
F.3d 810, 821-22 (10th Cir. 1998) (no Sixth Amendment 
violation where a convicted murderer voluntarily offered an 
inculpatory statement after receiving his Miranda rights); 
United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1517 (10th Cir. 
1993) ("Routine presentence interviews generally do not 
require Miranda warnings, even if the defendant is in 
custody facing serious punishment."); United States v. 
Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We also reject Tyler's argument that after Mitchell v. United States, 
526 U.S. 314, 328-29 (1999), decisions refusing to find the Fifth 
Amendment applies in the context of presentence interviews "should be 
reconsidered." Mitchell held a sentencing court could not draw adverse 
inferences from a convict's silence in determining facts related to the 
crime. Id. That situation is quite removed from one in which a convict 
voluntarily provides the sentencing judge with information. The Fifth 
Amendment provides "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Even the 
most generous interpretation of "compelled" testimony would not include 
Tyler's presentence letter. 
 
14. The record does not indicate Tyler requested and was denied the 
assistance of counsel in drafting the letter. 
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probation officer does not act on behalf of the prosecution 
. . . a presentence interview in a non-capital case is not a 
`critical stage' . . . ."); United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 
885-86 (4th Cir. 1991) (sentencing judges exercise 
"independent discretion and judgment in determining a 
defendant's sentence" and the denial of counsel in this 
context is "constitutionally insignificant"); Baumann v. 
United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(presentence interview not a "critical stage" given the 
sentencing judge's "wide discretion" in sentencing);15 United 
States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(same); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844-45 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (same). 
 
The Sixth Amendment does not apply in this case. Tyler 
voluntarily participated in the presentence investigation. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Tyler's counsel was 
excluded from the presentence process or that Tyler was 
forced to proceed without assistance of counsel. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit's rationale in United 
States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir. 1990), is 
instructive: 
 
       Counsel was surely aware that [the defendant] had to 
       be interviewed before sentencing, and counsel made no 
       objection. He was also aware at sentencing of the 
       damaging admissions made by [the defendant] in the 
       interview and still raised no [Sixth Amendment] 
       objection. Even if we assume that it was error for the 
       court to receive the statements, the error was not so 
       "plain" that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict 
       in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely 
       assistance in detecting it.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1990), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reserved the question 
of whether after the imposition of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
presentence interview represented a "critical stage" in federal courts 
given the reduced discretion in sentencing. The court held probation 
officers must permit defendants, if they request, to have attorneys 
present at such interviews as "an exercise of our supervisory power over 
the orderly administration of justice in the Ninth Circuit." Id. 
 
16. Though this case concerns Tyler's letter, not his presentence 
interview, the rationale in Colon remains persuasive. Because a 
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We also reject Tyler's analogy between his letter and a 
pretrial psychiatric interview. The Supreme Court declared 
the latter a "critical stage" of criminal proceedings, directly 
implicating the accused's Sixth Amendment rights. Estelle, 
451 U.S. at 469-71. But as the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held, Estelle's holding is properly limited to its 
facts, where the state neither informs defense counsel of its 
mental examination of the defendant during capital murder 
proceedings nor allows the defendant assistance of counsel. 
Baumann, 692 F.2d at 577-78 (contrasting "critical" 
determinations in capital-case mental examinations with 
usual sentencing phases). As in Baumann, and unlike in 
Estelle, Tyler's state court sentencing judge did not need to 
find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 
576. Tyler's written submission was a lawful practice in 
Pennsylvania, providing information the sentencing court, 
at its discretion, could consider when imposing sentence. 
The Sixth Amendment does not attach to this voluntary 
practice.17 
 
Nor did federal prosecutors obtain the letter in violation 
of Tyler's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth 
Amendment is ordinarily "offense specific." McNeil v. 
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). Although Sixth 
Amendment guarantees may apply to uncharged crimes 
factually related to charged offenses, Texas v. Cobb, 532 
U.S. 162 (2001) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299 (1932)),18 we do not find the Sixth Amendment 
barred use of Tyler's letter at his later federal trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sentencing judge may constitutionally question a convicted defendant 
appearing without counsel before sentencing, so can the judge consider 
a letter submitted voluntarily by the convicted defendant without 
violating the Sixth Amendment, even if the letter is sent without 
counsel's knowledge. 
17. For the reasons stated, we also reject Tyler's passing argument, 
presented in a footnote, that the United States violated his "additional" 
right to counsel found in the Fifth Amendment and based on the right 
against self-incrimination. 
 
18. On April 2, 2001, three days after Tyler submitted his briefs, the 
Supreme Court issued the Cobb opinion, which abrogated our holding in 
United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997). Arnold had 
established a limited exception to the offense-specific rule where two 
prosecutions are "closely related." We will employ the "factually related" 
language and analysis from Cobb in our resolution of Tyler's appeal. 
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As noted, Tyler's Sixth Amendment rights were not 
violated by the probation officer's solicitation or receipt of 
the letter. Had the events giving rise to Tyler's state and 
federal trials met the Blockburger test, 19 Tyler's Sixth 
Amendment rights never attached in the first instance. We 
also find unpersuasive Tyler's suggestion that the 
presentence investigation was the "halfway point" between 
successive state and federal prosecutions. As the District 
Court found, the government had not initiated its 
prosecution of Tyler when he wrote the letter. Tyler, No. 96- 
106, at 13. Almost three years passed between Tyler's 
drafting his presentence letter and his first federal 
indictment. This interlude demonstrates the probation 
office acted as a neutral factfinder for Tyler's state 
sentencing judge, not as an agent for federal prosecutors. 
Accord Jackson, 886 F.2d at 844 ("The probation officer 
does not have an adversarial role in the sentencing 
proceedings. . . . [T]he probation officer serves as a neutral 
information gatherer for the sentencing judge."). 20 We reject 
both of Tyler's Sixth Amendment claims. 
 
D. 
 
Tyler contends the presentence statement was provided 
by the probation office to the Pennsylvania State Police in 
violation of his rights to confidentiality and privacy. We 
have already rejected Tyler's constitutional claims in this 
context. We will not consider the application of state law -- 
specifically S 9733 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code21 -- 
where no federal constitutional principles are implicated. 
Having rejected Tyler's constitutional arguments regarding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme 
Court explained that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304. 
At least arguably, the same standards that would have convicted Tyler 
in state court would result in a federal court conviction. 
 
20. This language from Jackson concerned federal probation officers, but 
the rationale relating to the role of state probation officers is the 
same. 
 
21. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 9733 (West 2001). 
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the use of his letter in the federal proceeding, no further 
federal issues relating to the letter remain. On the facts 
here, we will not supervise the state courts' application of 
state law. 
 
VI. 
 
Tyler also challenges several District Court trial rulings. 
 
A. 
 
Tyler contends certain statements made at trial by 
Carlisle Detective David Fones were inadmissible hearsay. 
Fones testified that Doreen Proctor, while working 
undercover for the Tri-County Drug Force, told him Tyler's 
brother David had traveled outside of Pennsylvania to 
obtain drugs, providing statutory jurisdiction for 
prosecuting Willie Tyler and David Tyler for federal witness 
tampering. We review for abuse of discretion. United States 
v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The statements were offered only to demonstrate that 
federal officials had jurisdiction to initiate a federal drug 
investigation. The hearsay rule excludes "verbal acts," 
statements which themselves "affect[ ] the legal rights of the 
parties or [are] circumstance[s] bearing on conduct affecting 
their rights." FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note. 
In this sense, the veracity of Proctor's statement to Fones 
was irrelevant. Even if David Tyler did not actually operate 
his drug business outside of Pennsylvania, as Proctor 
indicated, Proctor's statement provided a jurisdictional 
basis for initiating a federal investigation into Tyler's 
activities. As such, the statements were not hearsay. Cf. 
Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 
897 n.3 (3d Cir. 1987) (testimony of track president's 
statement not hearsay where not offered to prove truth of 
its assertions but simply to demonstrate state action). The 
District Court properly allowed the testimony. 
 
B. 
 
Tyler contends the government, at closing argument, 
impermissibly referred to evidence outside the record, 
 
                                19 
  
specifically the trials of Ronique Bell and David Tyler. We 
see no error.22 With respect to the prosecution's references 
to Bell's trial, Tyler's counsel invited those references on 
cross-examination by asking questions of Laura Mae 
Barrett about her involvement in Bell's federal trial. 
Regardless, the District Court properly instructed the jury: 
 
       What may have been said or happened in other cases 
       is not evidence that you can consider against Mr. Tyler. 
       You must rely on the evidence and only the evidence 
       that you heard in this courtroom in determining the 
       guilt or innocence of Mr. Tyler, and you should not be 
       -- you should not credit or use as a factual -- as a 
       basis for finding any facts what might have occurred in 
       another case involving other parties. 
 
Tyler's counsel expressed satisfaction with the instruction. 
 
Moreover, the record contained several references to 
Willie Tyler's participation in his brother's drug trade. 
Ronique Bell's involvement in David Tyler's drug trade also 
provided Bell a motive to murder Proctor. Bell, 113 F.3d at 
1350. Whether or not Willie Tyler sold narcotics himself, 
the evidence demonstrated he faced federal prosecution for 
Proctor's murder. The District Court, at Tyler's request, 
properly instructed the jury: 
 
       First of all, I want to emphasize that this case is not 
       about selling narcotics, and there has been no 
       contention and there is no evidence that Mr. Tyler was 
       engaged in the sale of narcotics. So if that got into this 
       case in any way, the government is not arguing that 
       that occurred at all . . . . 
 
Tyler's counsel expressed satisfaction with the instruction. 
We see no error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The record is ambiguous regarding the objections made by Tyler's 
attorney during the prosecutor's closing argument. Tyler's attorney 
seems to have objected to a reference to Bell's trial. She did not object 
to the mention of Willie Tyler's trial. But earlier in the prosecutor's 
closing argument, the District Court granted Tyler's attorney a 
"continuing objection" to the prosecutor's argument and asked Tyler's 
attorney "not to interrupt" further. Given the District Court's 
instruction, 
we will review statements made by the prosecutor for error, not plain 
error. 
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C. 
 
Tyler contends the evidence was insufficient to prove 
Doreen Proctor would communicate with a federal law 
enforcement officer. Reviewing a claim of insufficiency, we 
"view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government and must sustain a jury's verdict if`a 
reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved 
all the elements of the offenses.' " United States v. Rosario, 
118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991)). Tyler cannot 
meet this "heavy burden." Id. 
 
The evidence showed Ronald Diller, who coordinated the 
Tri-County Drug Force, served the federal government as a 
"law enforcement officer" under 18 U.S.C.S 1515(a)(4).23 
Diller "would advise and consult" with the federal Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) "on a regular basis," and he had 
authority to develop cases. Indeed, Diller intended to refer 
Doreen Proctor to the DEA as a potential federal witness. 
The government need not have demonstrated Tyler believed 
Proctor would communicate with persons whom Tyler 
"knew or believed to be federal officers." Bell, 113 F.3d at 
1349. Section 1512 requires "proof that the officers with 
whom the defendant believed the victim might 
communicate would in fact be federal officers." Id. Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 
we reject Tyler's contention. 
 
D. 
 
Tyler suggests the District Court violated his 
constitutional right to confront witnesses by admitting 
testimony from Laura May Barrett that she heard Ronique 
Bell say to Tyler, "I shot Doreen, but you killed her." At 
trial, Tyler's counsel objected to this statement on reliability 
grounds but conceded it was otherwise admissible under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. That statute provides, "[T]he term`law enforcement officer' means an 
officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to 
act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal 
Government as an adviser or consultant . . . ." 
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the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 24 On 
appeal, Tyler raises Confrontation Clause concerns about 
the statement for the first time. The failure to object on 
those grounds at trial means the Confrontation Clause 
issue was not preserved for appeal. United States v. Gibbs, 
739 F.2d 838, 847-50 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting 
analogous arguments -- that the government failed to 
demonstrate the reliability of a co-conspirator's statement 
or the unavailability of the declarant -- where no objection 
was made at trial). As in Gibbs, the absence of evidence to 
show Bell's "unavailability" to testify is attributable to 
Tyler's failure to put the government on notice of its 
necessity. Id. 
 
Given Tyler's failure to object, we review only for plain 
error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) 
(plain error must be "obvious" and have "affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings"). We do not find 
the statement resulted in a "miscarriage of justice" or was 
otherwise "highly prejudicial." Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 
24 F.3d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1994). Provided an out-of-court 
statement qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the 
Confrontation Clause does not require the proponent of the 
statement to prove the declarant is unavailable. United 
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986). 25 And in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) provides in part,"A statement is not 
hearsay if . . . [it] is offered against a party and is . . . a statement 
by 
a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy." 
 
25. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme Court said the 
"general approach" required the government to demonstrate the 
unavailability of the declarant whose statement the government wished 
to use against the defendant. Id. at 65. Six years later, Inadi clarified 
that Roberts does not stand for a blanket proposition that "no out-of- 
court statement can be introduced . . . without a showing that the 
declarant is unavailable." 475 U.S. at 394. Specifically, the Inadi Court 
found the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of 
unavailability as a prerequisite to the admission of a co-conspirator's 
statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Id. at 399-400. Tyler contends Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), re-established that the government must 
demonstrate unavailability in such circumstances. But Idaho did not 
explicitly overrule Inadi; indeed, Idaho cited Inadi's holding. Id. at 
815. 
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Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the 
Supreme Court held the co-conspirator exception is"firmly 
rooted in our jurisprudence" so that a court"need not 
independently inquire into the reliability of such 
statements." Id. at 483. Therefore, the District Court need 
not have independently analyzed the reliability of Barrett's 
statement. We see no plain error. 
 
E. 
 
Tyler challenges the District Court's failure to conduct a 
charge conference under Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. But there is 
no error if the defense made specific objections to the 
charge or the failure to charge on particular points. United 
States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 220-21 (3d Cir. 1992). The 
District Court heard objections outside the jury's hearing. 
The Court gave additional instructions requested by 
counsel. Tyler's counsel expressed satisfaction with the 
final instructions to the jury. We see no error. 
 
The government did not misstate the law in closing 
argument by using the phrase "potential federal witness," 
which was consistent with the District Court's instructions 
and was clarified in response to a jury inquiry. Nor did the 
prosecutor's comment regarding Tyler's response to the Bell 
accusation constitute reversible error, as the evidence 
showed Tyler responded with an admonition to remain  
silent.26 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Moreover, Idaho did not concern the statement of a co-conspirator, but 
the statement of a three-year-old. Id. at 810-12. Under the current 
formulation of the Rules of Evidence, "unavailability" is only required if 
the particular hearsay exception requires it. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 356-57 (1992); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCES 246, at 124 
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) contains no such 
requirement. 
 
26. Furthermore, our review of the record demonstrates there was 
sufficient evidence to convict Tyler absent the letter, rendering its 
admission, at most, harmless error. A non-constitutional error 
committed at trial does not warrant reversal in circumstances where "it 
is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment." 
United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000). We may be 
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VII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
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firmly convinced that the alleged error was "harmless" without disproving 
every "reasonable possibility" of prejudice, United States v. Jannotti, 
729 
F.2d 213, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984), and we may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record, Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc). The testimonial evidence against Tyler was sufficient to 
convict him of intimidating and killing Doreen Proctor, conspiring to 
tamper with a witness, and using a firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence. 
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